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Gavin Hopps (St Andrews) 
 
    […] the angel and the devil faced each other and, mouths  
    wide open, emitted nearly the same sounds, but each one’s  
   noise expressed the absolute opposite of the other’s.  
    (Milan Kundera, “On Two Kinds of Laughter”)1 
 
Abstract 
This chapter is concerned with the function of laughter and irony in Byron’s verse. Typically, 
the poet’s levity is read as a “terminal” or “annihilating” gesture; this essay, by contrast, tests 
the cogency of more constructive, hopeful and hospitable readings. 
 
It has become customary to assume that Byron’s poetry delights in terminations, 
and in particular willed or staged terminations. Perhaps the most elegant 
formulation of this view is Hoxie Fairchild’s, who claimed that Byron was “too 
idealistic to refrain from blowing bubbles, and too realistic to refrain from 
pricking them.”2 Jerome McGann’s favoured image, which he uses three times in 
Byron and Romanticism, is Samson in the temple: “Byron’s is a poetry of 
spoliation where, like Samson among the Philistines, he pulls the temple down 
upon himself and everyone who comes to witness his prisoned strength.”3 
Typically, the process of poetic demolition is described as a “debunking 
technique,”4 though a number of more or less synonymous alternatives have been 
proposed. According to Hazlitt, Byron 
hallows in order to desecrate, takes a pleasure in defacing the images of beauty his 
hands have wrought, and raises our hopes and our belief in goodness to Heaven only 
to dash them to the earth again, and break them in pieces the more effectually from 
the very height they have fallen.5 
                                                          
1 The Book of Laughter and Forgetting, trans. Aaron Asher (1978; rpt. London: Faber, 
1996), 87. 
2 Hoxie Fairchild, The Romantic Quest (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1931), 370. 
3 Byron and Romanticism (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2002), 168. See also the 
essay on “Byron and Wordsworth,” in which he nudges the image closer to nihilism: 
“Byron emerges unmistakably as a character in his own work, a kind of Samson wrecking 
the pillars of his art: Out of this chaotic moment emerges the Gay Science of Byron’s 
comic immensities” (185). 
4 Claire Colebrook, Irony (London: Routledge, 2004), 78. 
5 William Hazlitt, The Spirit of the Age, in The Complete Works of William Hazlitt, ed. P.P. 
Howe, vol. XI (London: Dent, 1930–34), 75. 
 “Serious Laughter”: A Re-Assessment of Byron’s Terminal Irony 2 
In Anne Mellor’s view, Byron’s work involves a form of “transcendental 
buffoonery” that makes use of “Schlegelian” Romantic irony, and as such 
“simultaneously creates and de-creates itself.”6 For Alexandra Böhm, this 
conception of Byron’s laughter is too positive, since Schlegel’s irony, she 
contends, has an idealist cast, in that it gestures apophatically towards a totality 
that cannot be directly apprehended, whereas Byron’s “debunking and 
materializing” irony evinces a descendental tendency and involves a rejection of 
“the metaphysics of Romanticism.”7 In proposing instead a “carnivalesque” 
reading of Byron’s irony, Böhm is concurring with a number of scholars who have 
drawn on the work of Mikhail Bakhtin as a way of theorizing Byron’s practice in 
Don Juan, which is celebrated for its irreverent “dethronings,” its cartwheeling 
exposure of the undersides of things and its rebellious habits of “debasement and 
degradation.” A good example of this kind of reading is provided by Philip 
Martin, who argues that Don Juan’s “most typical movement” involves 
tipping the reverenced life of the spirit or the mind into a realm inhabited by the 
desires, needs and functions of the corporeal. Don Juan is a poem which is 
continuously elevating the body over the mind, thus inverting the archetypal Romantic 
moment (or that which is commonly taken as such) in which “we are laid asleep / In 
body, and become a living soul” […].8 
Debunking, desecration, de-creation, spoliation, defacement, dethroning, 
degradation and debasement: what links these assessments of Byron’s work is an 
emphasis on what Andrew Nicholson described as an “annihilating humor”9 or 
what we might refer to as a model of “terminal laughter.”10 My problem with these 
readings is simple: I do not believe that laughter necessarily “annihilates” or that 
debunking, debasement and desecration are, necessarily, a form of annulment. 
                                                          
6 Anne K. Mellor, English Romantic Irony (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 1980), 
63 and 5. 
7 Alexandra Böhm, “Transgressing Romanticism: Byron and Heine’s Carnivalesque Use of 
Romantic Irony,” in Byron: Heritage and Legacy, ed. Cheryl A. Wilson (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 184. 
8 Philip Martin, “Reading Don Juan with Bakhtin,” in Don Juan: Theory in Practice, ed. 
Nigel Wood (Buckingham: Open Univ. Press, 1993), 112. 
9 Andrew Nicholson, “Byron and Mahler: The Aesthetics of Humour,” in Byron: East and 
West, ed. Martin Procházka (Prague: Karolinum, 2000), 228. 
10 The phrase is taken from William H. Marshall’s concluding comments on the irony of Don 
Juan: “It is not satire, for it ultimately offers, in its description of the absurdities of the 
real, no suggestion of the ideal. His irony is terminal rather than instrumental” (The 
Structure of Byron’s Major Poems (Philadelphia: Pennsylvania Univ. Press, 1962), 177). 
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This chapter will attempt to substantiate these views.11 I shall do so on the one 
hand by invoking a range of theoretical models that posit alternative conceptions 
of laughter and on the other by highlighting aspects of Don Juan that appear to 
endorse or exemplify these alternatives. More precisely, I hope to identify forms 
of laughter that are not “terminal” or “annihilating” but which, on the contrary, 
hold open possibilities and exhibit a “hospitality to contradiction.”12 Before we 
proceed any further, though, it will be useful to remind ourselves of the sort of 
laughter that is under debate.13 
 
I Annihilating Humour 
In Canto I of Don Juan, the hero, tormented by his love for Julia, is wandering 
“by the glassy brooks, / Thinking unutterable things,” engaging in “self-commun-
ion with his own high soul” and thus turning “without perceiving his condition, / 
Like Coleridge, into a metaphysician” (I, 90–1). 
He thought about himself, and the whole earth, 
 Of man the wonderful, and of the stars, 
And how the deuce they ever could have birth; 
 And then he thought of earthquakes, and of wars, 
How many miles the moon might have in girth, 
 Of air-balloons, and of the many bars 
To perfect knowledge of the boundless skies; 
And then he thought of Donna Julia’s eyes. 
 
In thoughts like these true wisdom may discern 
 Longings sublime, and aspirations high, 
Which some are born with, but the most part learn 
 To plague themselves withal, they know not why: 
                                                          
11 My argument is in part prompted by Drummond Bone’s suggestive comments—in his 
response to Andrew Nicholson’s paper—that Byron’s “is an irony not of annihilation, but 
of preservation”; see Bone, “Romantic Irony Revisited,” in Byron: East and West, 247. 
12 For the latter phrase in quotation marks, I am indebted to Jane Stabler, “Byron, 
Postmodernism and Intertextuality,” in Cambridge Companion to Byron, ed. Drummond 
Bone (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2004), 270. The alternatives I am suggesting 
broadly correspond to, but also complicate, the distinction proposed by Harriet Margaret 
MacKenzie, in her study of Byron’s humour, between “gracious” and “ungracious” 
laughter, where the former “seeks to destroy by making ridiculous,” whilst the latter is 
“tolerant” and “engaged in behalf of rather than against the object.” MacKenzie, Byron’s 
Laughter: In Life and Poetry (California: Lymanhouse, 1939), 1–2. 
13 For the purposes of this chapter, I shall be using “laughter” as a metonymy for all forms 
of levity. 
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’Twas strange that one so young should thus concern 
 His brain about the action of the sky; 
If you think ’twas philosophy that this did, 
I can’t help thinking puberty assisted. (I, 92–3)14 
Commenting on this episode, Alexandra Böhm has written: “Juan’s metaphysical 
musings are eventually brought down to material needs: ‘He found how much old 
Time had been a winner— / He also found that he had lost his dinner’ (I, 94). 
Here, Byron links Juan’s puberty to Wordsworth’s ‘self-communion’ and 
Coleridge’s metaphysics. In this way, he brings the high claims of Romanticism 
back to the mundane materiality of life.”15 We all of course snigger at “puberty 
assisted” and at Juan’s discovery that “he had lost his dinner.” But what exactly 
is the effect of such laughter? According to Böhm, this is an illustration of Byron’s 
“debunking” irony. But is anything in this passage actually exposed as specious? 
Is the fact that we also need to eat an argument against metaphysics? Does the 
fact that “puberty” or sexual desire may prompt Juan to wonder about the meaning 
of life entail that this isn’t real wondering or that finite, erotic longings might not 
simultaneously be interlaced with intimations of something that sublimely 
exceeds them? The phrases doing most of the work in Böhm’s interpretation are 
“brought down to material needs” and “brings … back to the mundane materiality 
of life,” which imply a return to reality after a sojourn in the clouds and a 
demystification that dispels the significance of the antecedent metaphysical 
musings. Yet does Byron’s irony bring things “down to earth” in this way? Or 
does it set one perspective alongside another, allowing them to relativize each 
other’s claims, but nonetheless allowing both to stand? To put this another way, 
can we assume that Byron’s irony effaces the significance of what it smirks at? 
Might it not involve a “letting be,” as Jane Stabler suggests, and signal instead of 
an “annihilation” the recognition of a simultaneous diversity of claims?16 I shall 
leave these questions hanging for now, as it is the aim of the chapter as a whole 
to contest the sufficiency of the “terminal” model and to test the cogency of some 
alternative readings. It is worth noting, however—lest we assume that Byron 
always speaks from the side of the “mundane materiality of life” and sniggers at 
the “ideal”—that in Don Juan he does the reverse as well. Here is another 
description of Juan “in his reverie” (XVI, 106) from the penultimate canto of the 
poem: 
                                                          
14 All quotations from Byron’s verse are taken from: Lord Byron: The Complete Poetical 
Works, ed. Jerome J. McGann and Barry Weller, 7 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980–
93). 
15 Böhm, “Transgressing Romanticism,” 182. 
16 Stabler, “Byron, Postmodernism and Intertextuality,” 270. 
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The ghost at least had done him this much good, 
 In making him as silent as a ghost, 
If in the circumstances which ensued 
 He gained esteem where it was worth the most. 
And certainly Aurora had renewed 
 In him some feelings he had lately lost 
Or hardened; feelings which, perhaps ideal, 
Are so divine, that I must deem them real:— 
 
The love of higher things and better days; 
 The unbounded hope, and heavenly ignorance 
Of what is called the world, and the world’s ways […]. (XVI, 107–8) 
Byron’s rhyming of the “ideal” and the “real,” which he does repeatedly 
throughout Don Juan,17 is a synecdoche of the poem’s larger investigative yoking 
of these two perspectives. Earlier on in the narrative, as we might expect, Byron 
emphatically stands up for the “real” over the “ideal.” Having remarked in his 
opening description of Haidée, for example, that she was “Fit for the model of a 
statuary,” the narrator adds: “A race of mere impostors, when all’s done— / I’ve 
seen much finer women, ripe and real, / Than all the nonsense of their stone ideal” 
(II, 118). This stance appears to be consonant with what Böhm describes as the 
poet’s carnivalesque “debunking” of Juan’s metaphysical musings in Canto I. In 
the episode quoted above, however, from the extraordinary “haunted” English 
Cantos, the shoe is on the other foot; for the poem’s carnivalesque tendency to 
elevate the corporeal over the “life of the spirit” is itself reversed by the advent of 
a twofold “spirituality”: on the one hand, by the ghost—which has in a sense 
suspended Juan’s corporeality18—and on the other by the Roman Catholic Aurora, 
whose explicitly religious presence interrupts, temporarily at least, the sexual 
proclivities of the poem’s hero, who when faced with Aurora is compared to a 
“ship entangled among ice” (XV, 77).19 The general point I wish to make is that 
whilst it is possible to find moments in the poem where Byron is sniggering at 
“the high claims of Romanticism” from the perspective of “mundane materiality,” 
it is also possible conversely to find moments where he relativizes the claims of 
this materialist perspective and stands up for “higher things”; moments, that is, in 
                                                          
17 See, for example, II, 211; X, 20; and XIV, 22. 
18 The ascendency of spirit over matter is made even more explicit a few stanzas later: “A 
single shade’s sufficient to entrance a / Hero—for what is substance to a Spirit? / Or how 
is’t matter trembles to come near it?” (XVI, 116). 
19 It might be more accurate to say that Aurora “re-orients” or even “redeems” Juan’s sexual 
desire, since the poem complicatedly suggests that she at once resists and “renews” his 
desire, which—as the winking pun on “hardened” suggests—remains erotic but is now 
informed by a “love of higher things.” 
 “Serious Laughter”: A Re-Assessment of Byron’s Terminal Irony 6 
which “the life of the spirit” is indeed “reverenced.”20 Böhm’s one-sided reading 
of Byron’s laughter brings to light a more general problem with “carnivalesque” 
readings of Don Juan; namely, that they are programmatically predisposed only 
to capture one half of the poet’s explorations of the relationship between the 
“ideal” and the “real.” Another major problem is that they unwittingly import 
Bakhtin’s own critical prejudices into the interpretation of Byron’s poem, the 
most obvious of which is the historically inaccurate contention that the 
carnivalesque is innately opposed to the religious, which encourages the kind of 
binary thinking underlying the “terminal” model of irony.21 
Let us return to our primary story. If, as Bone and Stabler suggest, the model 
of “annihilating” irony is inadequate, what are the alternatives? 
 
II Eschatological Indifference 
A form of laughter that resembles but ultimately differs from the model of 
“annihilating humor” is the laughter associated with contemptus mundi or the 
related notion of theatrum mundi. This kind of laughter is in one sense manifestly 
negative, since it is aimed at and radically vitiates the significance of the whole 
of human existence. And yet it isn’t a purely negative or nihilistic gesture, as it 
posits something of superordinate importance outside the “theatre,” in light of 
which this-worldly realities pale into insignificance.22 Max Weber has a fine 
phrase for the posture that is engendered by such a perspective. In his discussion 
of Luther’s conception of the religious calling in The Protestant Ethic and the 
                                                          
20 Geoff Ward arrives at a similar conclusion in “Byron’s Artistry in Deep and Layered 
Space,” in Byron and the Limits of Fiction, ed. Bernard Beatty and Vincent Newey 
(Liverpool: Liverpool Univ. Press, 1988). After distinguishing between the secular 
immanence of “layered space” and the metaphysical or religious conception of “deep 
space,” he draws attention to the ways in which “the temporal and secular particularities 
of a layered-space” are used in Don Juan in order to “deflate pretensions to the deep”; 
however, Ward then relativizes this tendency by setting it alongside “Byron’s 
complementary habit of disrupting a too-neatly layered representation of human space by 
hinting at the deep” (213). 
21 It is now widely accepted that Bakhtin’s dichotomous conception of medieval culture, 
according to which the popular festive sphere is seen as a “second life” that is set over 
against the “monolithic seriousness” of the official religious order, is a mythical construct 
or anti-Stalinist allegory that does not correspond to the historical data. For a good 
corrective historical account of the relationship between religion and carnivalesque 
laughter in the medieval period, see Martha Bayless, Parody in the Middle Ages: The Latin 
Tradition (Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press, 1996). 
22 A classic example of such laughter is found in Chaucer’s Troilus and Criseyde (1808–25). 
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Spirit of Capitalism, Weber speaks of the attitude of “eschatological indifference” 
[eschatologischen Indifferenz],23 which is based on the Pauline comportment of 
“as if not”: 
those who have wives should live as if they do not; those who mourn, as if they did 
not; those who are happy, as if they were not; those who buy something, as if it were 
not theirs to keep; those who use the things of the world, as if not engrossed in them. 
For this world in its present form is passing away. (1 Corinthians 7:29–31) 
The laughter associated with contemptus mundi, which evinces a posture of 
“eschatological indifference,” thus has a “towards” as well as an “away from”—
which is lacking in the negation of “terminal” laughter—in that it gestures 
implicitly towards something of value beyond the horizon of its negation. In other 
words, negation isn’t its terminus; it is a no-saying that has a yes-saying behind 
it. Are there any signs of such laughter in Don Juan? 
The evidence is ambiguous, as it is difficult to determine with any 
conclusiveness whether Byron’s laughter is informed by an “eschatological” 
bearing. There are, however, undoubtedly intimations of such a perspective, even 
if it isn’t always wholeheartedly endorsed, both in the narrator’s meta-poetic 
comments and in the point of view from which he aspires to speak.24 Here is an 
example of the former: 
   I hope it is no crime 
To laugh at all things—for I wish to know 
What after all, are all things—but a Show? 
 
[…] I say no more than hath been said in Dante’s 
Verse, and by Solomon and by Cervantes; 
 
By Swift, by Machiavel, by Rochefoucault, 
 By Fenelon, by Luther, and by Plato; 
By Tillotson, and Wesley, and Rousseau, 
 Who knew this life was not worth a potato. […]  
 
Ecclesiastes said, that all is Vanity— 
 Most modern preachers say the same, or show it 
By their examples of true Christianity; 
                                                          
23 Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, trans. Talcott Parsons (1904–5; 
New York: Norton, 2009), 42. 
24 As an illustration of the latter, one might point towards the narrator’s habit of adopting a 
“posthumous gaze”; that is, his tendency to step as it were outside of finitude and speak of 
existence from the vantage of an “afterwards” or sub specie aeternitatis. For a more 
detailed discussion of this, see “Gaiety and Grace: Byron and the Tone of Catholicism,” 
The Byron Journal 41, no. 1 (2013): 10–11. 
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 In short, all know, or very soon may know it; 
And in this scene of all-confessed inanity, 
 By saint, by sage, by preacher, and by poet, 
Must I restrain me, through the fear of strife, 
From holding up the Nothingness of life? (VII, 2–4; 6) 
The perspective appears to shift around in these lines, since the sense of theatrum 
mundi with which they begin—which lacks any countervailing “towards” and 
seems to anticipate an absurdist vision, as articulated for example in the work of 
Camus—gives way to a much more mixed perspective, as suggested by the 
figures he cites as precedents, some of whom are religious, some of whom are 
not, and with some it is rather hard to say. However, the narrator then invokes a 
scriptural perspective—and a text to which he refers elsewhere in Don Juan25—
as a way of defending his posture of contemptus mundi (“Ecclesiastes said, that 
all is Vanity”). As we can see from this passage, then, the poet doesn’t always 
acknowledge an eschatological “towards” (although “arguments from silence” are 
of course problematical). Nevertheless, he does, recurrently, bring into the poem 
a religious perspective and acknowledge the possible truth of its claims. Indeed, 
the foregoing list, which mixes religious and non-religious figures without 
valorizing either, appears in miniature to resemble the openness of the poem itself, 
which certainly doesn’t privilege a religious perspective but does, nonetheless, 
keep its claims in play. This sceptical openness towards an eschatological 
horizon—which is an openness that is predicated on, rather than imperiled by, the 
poet’s scepticism—is illustrated in the following lines: 
Death laughs—Go ponder o’er the skeleton 
 With which men image out the unknown thing 
That hides the past world, like to a set sun 
 Which still elsewhere may rouse a brighter spring […]. (IX, 11) 
Byron’s ventriloquizing of a contemptus mundi laughter—which appears to owe 
something to Holbein’s Dance of Death, to which he alludes later on in the poem 
(XV, 49)—is delicately poised on a non-committal “may” (“which still elsewhere 
may rouse a brighter spring”), which associates this all-negating laughter with an 
other-worldly “towards” as well as an “away from.” To be sure, this “towards” is 
accorded the status of a “perhaps”; however, even the shadowy, subjunctive 
opening of a “perhaps” holds open a possibility and is sufficient to distinguish 
this kind of laughter from the model that proposes “annihilation” as its terminus. 
Let us consider another alternative, for must laughter always be so 
destructive? Since it is Don Juan on which we are focusing, giggling should never 
be far away. 
                                                          
25 See Don Juan, I, 15. 
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III Eutrapelia26 
In his essay on Don Juan in The Shield of Perseus, W.H. Auden classifies Byron’s 
poem as a comedy as opposed to a satire, foregrounds the role of contradiction in 
this genre, and notes that the poet’s choice of “giggle” instead of “laugh” to 
describe his comic intention “deserves consideration.”27 He then offers the 
following reflections on Don Juan in light of these premises: 
All comic situations show a contradiction between some general or universal principle 
and an individual or particular person or event. In the case of the situation at which 
we giggle, the general principles are two: 
 1) The sphere of the sacred and the sphere of the profane are mutually exclusive. 
 2) The sacred is that at which we do not laugh. 
Now a situation arises in which the profane intrudes upon the sacred but without 
annulling it. If the sacred were annulled, we should laugh outright, but the sacred is 
still felt to be present, so that a conflict ensues between the desire to laugh and the 
feeling that laughter is inappropriate. A person to whom the distinction between the 
sacred and the profane had no meaning could never giggle.28 
Leaving aside the questionable assumption that the sense of propriety that 
engenders giggling is limited to the religious sphere, what is of particular interest 
to our discussion is the apparently incidental observation that “the profane 
intrudes upon the sacred but without annulling it.” Indeed, Auden’s conception of 
Don Juan’s giggling is predicated upon the persistence or continuing operation 
of the sacred in spite of the profane intrusion. To put this in the terms of our 
general discussion, the act of profanation that elicits our giggling does not, in 
Auden’s view, “annihilate” the sacred or efface a sense of reverence towards it. 
Rather, he suggests, a sense of reverence is precisely what occasions our giggling. 
In contrast, then, to the “terminal” model, proposed by Fairchild and McGann et 
al., what Auden brings into view is a much more “hospitable” model of levity, in 
which giggling doesn’t cancel out but coincides with reverence. In the words of 
Giorgio Agamben, who has proposed a parallel reading of “profanation”: “play 
                                                          
26 “Eutrapelia” literally means “ease at turning” and refers to the ability “to turn aptly into 
laughter what is said and done” (Hugo Rahner, Man at Play (New York: Herder & Herder, 
1967), 100). Rahner has further defined the quality as follows: “This refined mentality of 
eutrapelia is therefore a kind of mobility of the soul, by which a truly cultured person 
‘turns’ to lovely, bright and relaxing things, without losing himself in them” (ibid., 94–5). 
27 W.H. Auden, “Don Juan,” in The Dyer’s Hand and Other Essays (New York: Random 
House, 1962), 389. 
28 Ibid., 389–90. 
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frees and distracts humanity from the sphere of the sacred, without simply 
abolishing it.”29 This, to me, sounds closer to Don Juan than the zero sum model 
of “terminal” laughter. 
Perhaps the strongest support for this hospitable model of “letting be” is 
provided by the poet himself. In a celebrated note to the stanzas describing 
Adeline’s “mobility” in Canto XV of Don Juan, Byron writes: 
I am not sure that mobility is English, but it is expressive of a quality which rather 
belongs to other climates, though it is sometimes seen to a great extent in our own. It 
may be defined as an excessive susceptibility of immediate impressions—at the same 
time without losing the past […].30 
Byron is of course here speaking about the dominant attribute of one of his 
characters. Yet his note has a peculiarly defensive quality, which suggests that 
something more is at stake—a “something more,” as many critics have noted, that 
may be explained by the apparent correspondence between the “mobility” he 
defends and the narrative manner of the poem itself.31 If this is the case, both the 
note and the corresponding description of Adeline would seem to have 
implications for the poem’s irony. In the former, it is emphatically asserted that 
“mobility” does not entail “losing the past”; here is what is stated in the latter: 
So well she acted all and every part 
 By turns—with that vivacious versatility, 
Which many people take for want of heart. 
 They err—’tis merely what is called mobility, 
A thing of temperament and not of art, 
 Though seeming so, from its supposed facility; 
And false—though true; for surely they’re sincerest, 
Who are strongly acted on by what is nearest. (XVI, 97) 
Adeline’s “mobile” responses are described by the poet as “false—though true,” 
which I take to mean “false” in the sense of unfaithful or simultaneously having 
other attachments as well, and yet “true” in the sense of “sincerely” felt. If, as 
Drummond Bone maintains, this logic applies to the poet’s use of irony,32 it 
suggests a sort of “lateral” persistence, in contrast to the “vertical” transcendence 
                                                          
29 Agamben, “In Praise of Profanation,” in Profanations, trans. Jeff Fort (New York: Zone 
Books, 2007), 76. 
30 CPW, V, 769. Italics in the original. 
31 See, for example, George Ridenour, The Style of “Don Juan” (New Haven: Yale Univ. 
Press, 1960), 164–5. 
32 “Don Juan’s irony does not apocalyptically vanish up its own tail. It is not ‘ominous.’ 
Byron defined ‘mobility,’ that crucial romantic irony function, as the ability to be affected 
by immediate impressions, but without losing the past. His is an irony not of annihilation, 
but of preservation. It does indeed hover.” Bone, “Romantic Irony Revisited,” 247. 
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of the eschatological paradigm. In both cases, however, such laughter exhibits a 
“non-terminal” character—in that it is hospitable to the possibility of a “beside” 
or a “beyond”—which doesn’t invalidate the “annihilating” reading, though it 
calls into question its explanatory scope. 
 
IV Apophasis 
As we are carrying quite a few distinctions forward, it may be useful to recap our 
findings so far. To begin with, we looked at the dominant model of “terminal” 
irony, a version of which is espoused by McGann, Mellor, Böhm and others. 
According to this reading, Byron’s laughter is a form of negation, which 
desecrates, de-creates or annihilates the ideal. In contrast to this model, I 
highlighted the prevalence of a form of laughter associated with an attitude of 
contemptus mundi, which has as it were an “amphibious” character, in that it is 
on the one hand comprehensively negative, though on the other its negation is a 
prefatory form of affirmation, since it posits—or at least holds open the possibility 
of—something beyond what it comprehensively negates. In contrast, then, to both 
of these models, based on the suggestions of Bone and Stabler, a model of 
hospitable coexistence or “letting be” was proposed, which relativizes—but 
doesn’t cancel out or discredit—the claims of the ideal by simultaneously 
recognizing a variety of divergent claims. There is, however, yet another 
possibility; for instead of seeing the comic pattern of blowing and then pricking 
bubbles—or positing and then laughing at the ideal—as constituted by 
antagonistic gestures in series, it is also possible to read this pattern as a dialectic 
of complementary gestures, which generates its meaning between the proposition 
and its rejoinder. This may seem rather puzzling when stated as an abstraction, 
but it corresponds to a traditional way of speaking about the ideal. In the mystical 
writings of Plotinus or Denys, for example, we frequently encounter dialectical 
strategies of “unsaying,” where something is on the one hand “kataphatically” 
ventured and on the other hand “apophatically” countermanded.33 This isn’t, 
however, a matter of scepticism or a simple cancelling out of what is affirmed. It 
is rather an attempt to speak about that which is “otherwise than” being, whilst 
avoiding the idolatry of finite predication. In the words of Michael Sells, it is a 
“dis-ontological discursive effort to avoid reifying the transcendent as an ‘entity’ 
or ‘being’ or ‘thing.’”34 By means of this strategy of “double delimitation,” which 
                                                          
33 “Kataphasis” is a mode of affirmation (literally a saying or “speaking-with”) whilst 
“apophasis” is a mode of negation (literally an un-saying or “speaking-away”). 
34 Michael Sells, Mystical Languages of Unsaying (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1994), 
6. 
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is akin to the postmodern practice of placing a referent “under erasure,” one may 
refer, paradoxically, by drawing attention to the failure of referentiality. We find 
a nice illustration of this in Byron’s description of the archangel Michael in The 
Vision of Judgment: 
He turned all colours—as a peacock’s tail, 
 Or sunset streaming through a Gothic skylight  
In some old abbey, or a trout not stale, 
 Or distant lightning on the horizon by night, 
Or a fresh rainbow, or a grand review  
Of thirty regiments in red, green, and blue. (61) 
Whilst the stanza’s proliferating string of comparisons clearly evinces a this-
worldly delight in the variousness of things and the wide-ranging experience of a 
man of the world, it is at the same time, with its fidgeting “or”s, an advertisement 
of its own referential inadequacy.35 And yet, as a result of this very deficiency—
which stages the failure of referentiality as such—it brings into view an 
unenvisageable object.36 
To make matters more complicated, it is possible to accomplish both of these 
“dialectical” procedures simultaneously—apophatically “unsaying” what one 
kataphatically ventures. According to Ruskin, this is precisely what is involved in 
the “noble” grotesque, whose fantastic distortions serve a hermeneutic rather than 
a mimetic purpose, in that they signal the limitations of the fallen gaze—which is 
incapable of directly beholding the divine—though in doing so, they point 
towards a transcendent plenitude that exceeds all determinate representations.37 
What I am suggesting, then, is that comedy may, in a parallel manner, serve an 
“apophatic” function—in that, like a wink, it may affect the status of that which 
                                                          
35   See Lori Kanitz’s chapter, section V, “The Clay Man in Whom Universes Spin,” for the  
       discussion of a parallel tendency in the work of Annie Dillard.  
36 See also stanzas 28 and 54, in which the poet reflects on the problems of representing the 
transcendent by means of “earthly likenesses” and “comparisons from clay.” 
37 Ruskin compares the gaze of “the fallen human soul” to a broken “diminishing glass” in 
its attempts to apprehend “the mighty truths” of the universe: “the wider the scope of its 
glance, and the vaster the truths into which it obtains an insight, the more fantastic their 
distortion is likely to be, as the winds and vapours trouble the field of the telescope most 
when it reaches farthest.” Ruskin, The Stones of Venice, vol. 2 (London: George Allen, 
1900), 198–9. Denys puts forward a related argument in defending the use of “dissimilar 
similarities” or incongruous figures for referring to the divine, whose very 
inappropriateness, he suggests, is the ground of their efficacy, and which he privileges over 
other more “worthy” comparisons, since in advertising their “unlikeness” or referential 
shortfall, they are less likely to elicit an idolatrous sense of having comprehended what is 
“beyond all names.” See The Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 2. 
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is posited—by calling attention to “the ‘is not’ within the ‘is’” of its predication.38 
(The everyday disclaimer “I was only joking” attempts to perform such a gesture 
retroactively.) This is in fact what Auden argues, in a much less cumbersome 
fashion, in “Balaam and His Ass.” Referring to Don Quixote he writes: 
It is the omnipresent comedy that makes the book orthodox; present the relationship 
[between Don Quixote and Sancho Panza] as tragic and the conclusion is Manichean, 
present either or both of the characters as serious, and the conclusion is pagan or 
pelagian. The man who takes seriously the command of Christ to take up his cross 
and follow Him must, if he is serious, see himself as a comic figure, for he is not the 
Christ, only an ordinary man, yet he believes that the command, “Be ye perfect,” is 
seriously addressed to himself. Worldly “sanity” will say, “I am not Christ, only an 
ordinary man. For me to think that I can become perfect would be madness. Therefore, 
the command cannot seriously be addressed to me.” The other can only say, “It is 
madness for me to attempt to obey the command, for it seems impossible; 
nevertheless, since I believe it is addressed to me, I must believe that it is possible”; 
in proportion as he takes the command seriously, that is, he will see himself as a comic 
figure.39 
According to Auden, comedy is the inevitable outcome of our fallen attempts to 
approximate the divine. And yet this necessity may be turned into a virtue, for by 
the same token comedy therefore offers us a way of “apophatically” signaling a 
shortfall in our attempts at representing the divine—which in turn provides us 
with a way of outwitting Wittgenstein’s veto, as it thereby becomes possible to 
gesture meaningfully towards that about which we cannot speak. Thus comedy is, 
as it were, the cross that puts our predications “under erasure.” (In a discussion of 
the work of Anselm Kiefer, Mark Taylor has written of how the canvas “trembles 
with the approach of an Other it cannot figure.”40 Laughter, I am suggesting, is an 
alternative way of representing that trembling.) Importantly, however, in contrast 
to the “terminal” model of irony, this apophatic “crossing out” doesn’t annihilate 
but paradoxically enables—by signalling the radical inadequacy of—our 
referential gesture. 
Although these somewhat abstruse concerns may appear to carry us away 
from a poet who repeatedly expressed a distaste for metaphysics, this kind of 
“apophatic” logic surfaces in a variety of contexts throughout Don Juan. (The 
poet’s claim that it is necessary to be inconsistent in order paradoxically to show 
                                                          
38 Paul Ricoeur, The Rule of Metaphor: Multi-Disciplinary Studies of the Creation of 
Meaning in Language, trans. Robert Czerny et al. (Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1977), 
249. 
39 W.H. Auden, “Balaam and His Ass,” in The Dyer’s Hand and Other Essays, 135. 
40 Mark C. Taylor, Disfiguring: Art, Architecture, Religion (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago 
Press, 1992), 305. 
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“things existent”41 also appears to point in this direction.) The narrator, for 
example, frequently calls attention to the failure of language to reach the object it 
aspires to describe, even in relatively mundane contexts. Sometimes he does this 
by reflexively commenting on its baffled aspirations. When attempting to describe 
the dwarves who guard the harem in Canto V, for instance, he writes: their colour 
“was not black, not white, nor gray, / But an extraneous mixture, which no pen / 
Can trace, although perhaps the pencil may” (88). Similarly, when trying to 
describe Gulbayez, he interrupts himself with the optative lament: 
Would that I were a painter! to be grouping 
 All that a poet drags into detail! 
Oh that my words were colours! but their tints 
May serve perhaps as outlines or slight hints. (VI, 109) 
And when Juan seeks to explain his behaviour to Gulbayez, the narrator 
comments: 
So he began to stammer some excuses; 
 But words are not enough in such a matter, 
Although you borrow’d all that e’er the muses 
 Have sung, or even a Dandy’s dandiest chatter, 
Or all the figures Castlereagh abuses […]. (V, 143) 
On other occasions, though, the narrator “performatively” draws attention to the 
radical inadequacies of language, typically by means of the kind of similitive 
stammering we witnessed in the description of the archangel Michael. Here are a 
couple of examples: 
The evaporation of a joyous day 
 Is like the last glass of champagne, without 
The foam which made its virgin bumper gay; 
 Or like a system coupled with a doubt; 
Or like a soda bottle when its spray 
 Has sparkled and let half its spirit out; 
Or like a billow left by storms behind, 
Without the animation of the wind; 
 
Or like an opiate, which brings troubled rest, 
 Or none; or like—like nothing that I know 
Except itself;—such is the human breast; 
 A thing, of which similitudes can show 
No real likeness […]. (XVI, 9–10) 
 
                                                          
41 Don Juan, XV, 87. 
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A fourth as marble, statue-like and still, 
 Lay in a breathless, hushed, and stony sleep; 
White, cold, and pure, as looks a frozen rill, 
 Or the snow minaret on an Alpine steep, 
Or Lot’s wife done in salt,—or what you will;— 
 My similes are gathered in a heap, 
So pick and choose […]. (VI, 68) 
The poet’s tendency to throw out similes, like someone looking through a draw 
of socks, is of course part of a larger tendency to dramatize the poem’s coming 
into being and include the moment of its composition within the finished work 
itself. Yet the profusion of similes also, more subtly, points towards the many-
sidedness of what it seeks to represent, in a manner that resembles the “eccentric” 
geometries of an orthodox icon, which attempts to depict objects with all of their 
dimensions impossibly unfolded to the frontal gaze. However, there is 
additionally a sense in the latter example, which seeks to depict the uncanny 
death-like state of sleep, that the poet isn’t simply adverting to the problem for a 
“linear” medium of representing the plurality of thing’s dimensions, but is at the 
same time more radically responding to an ineffable dimension in the thing 
itself—a mysterious “more” at the heart of what it is—that by its very nature 
exceeds determinate representation. Either way, the poet’s staging of the 
inadequacies of predication, by way of a proliferating series of similes, 
paradoxically serves a descriptive purpose, in representing even as it depicts a 
phenomenon an elusive dimension that belongs to its appearing. In other words, 
the poet’s similitive stammering performs a sort of “apophatic” function. Is there 
any evidence that laughter serves this purpose in Don Juan? 
Perhaps the most extreme example is to be found, I suggest, in the shipwreck 
episode of Canto II, in which the loss of the Trinidada—and the terrible scenes of 
death, madness and cannibalism to which it leads—is narrated in an 
incongruously “grave and gay” style.42 To be sure, this may seem like an odd place 
to look for “apophatic” laughter, since for many readers—and especially Byron’s 
contemporaries—the “wild and horrid glee”43 of this canto is the most nihilistic 
laughter of all.44 And yet another, more sympathetic reading is possible, which 
recognizes the flagrant incongruity of such laughter but which accords it a more 
constructive function as part of an attempt to represent the unspeakable. The logic 
of this kind of laughter has been helpfully summarized by Slavoj Žižek. 
                                                          
42 Francis Cohen, letter to John Murray, 16 July 1819; cited by Peter Cochran in “Francis 
Cohen, Don Juan and Casti,” Romanticism 4, no. 1 (1998): 120–4. 
43 Don Juan, II, 50. 
44 For a survey of contemporary readers’ responses, see Jane Stabler, Byron, Poetics and 
History (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2002), ch. 1. 
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In his discussion of the recent rise of “Holocaust comedies” in Did Somebody 
Say Totalitarianism? Žižek argues not only that laughter in such a context may 
be morally sanctioned but, even more boldly, that it may paradoxically be a way 
of showing respect for the victims of such horror. The reason he gives relates to 
its unspeakability: 
[…] the stuff of comedy is things which elude our grasp; laughter is one way of coping 
with the incomprehensible. If no direct realistic staging can be adequate to the horror 
of the Holocaust, then the only way out of the predicament is to turn to comedy which, 
at least, accepts its failure to express the horror of the Holocaust in advance and, 
moreover, projects this gap between the represented and its failed representation into 
its very narrative content […].45 
Comedy, for Žižek, may thus be a kind of apophatic expedient, which 
paradoxically communicates by advertising a failure of communication, whose 
very tastelessness is the index of this linguistic crisis. In this way—by making the 
medium of vision itself stammer—comedy brings “anamorphically” into view 
that which eludes direct representation. Whilst there isn’t space in the current 
chapter to offer a full-scale defence of this reading in relation to Don Juan, I think 
it is possible to argue along these lines that Byron’s laughter in the shipwreck 
narrative—which is accompanied by an acknowledgement of its 
inappropriateness (II, 50), a recurrence of ineffability topoi (II, 5–6; II, 30) and is 
interrupted by a moment of “redemptive pathos” (II, 87–90)—is a conscious 
“apophatic” strategy that attempts to communicate by in some sense disrupting 
our relationship with a tragedy to which no “direct realistic staging” would be 
adequate.46 
 
* 
 
What I have attempted to do in this chapter is to contest the dominance of 
“terminal” readings of Byron’s irony. Whilst accepting that some of the poet’s 
laughter may perhaps be described as “annihilating,” I have sought to show that 
                                                          
45 Žižek, Did Somebody Say Totalitarianism? Five Interventions in the (Mis)use of a Notion 
(London: Verso, 2001), 68. 
46 According to Žižek, there is an important moment in Holocaust comedies in which all 
laughter is reverently suspended and “we are given a ‘serious’ pathetic message” (ibid., 
72). Byron’s deeply “pathetic” description of the father and his dying son in the midst of 
the shipwreck narrative (II, 88–90) is, I suggest, just such a moment of redemptive pathos, 
in that its delicate, touching and reverent presentation of death, love and human dignity 
communicates the unspeakable tragedy of the shipwreck as a whole—in a way that 
respectfully preserves the ineffability of its horror—through an “anamorphic” focus on a 
single moment. 
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his comic masterpiece Don Juan involves a variety of other forms of laughter as 
well—forms of laughter, in particular, that have less to do with bringing 
something to an end and more to do with preserving alternatives and holding open 
possibilities. 
By way of a coda, since this volume is concerned with endings and 
eschatological horizons, I would like to draw attention to one final way in which 
Byron’s laughter, even where it might be described as “debunking,” foreshadows 
and entices us towards an “afterwards” or a “not yet,” which as Ernst Bloch 
resolutely reminds us, is an ideal that “is not refuted by its non-being.”47 This 
“eschatological” conception of laughter differs from those we have considered so 
far, though, as its significance is primarily a matter of affect. To explain this 
model, it will be helpful to refer briefly to Peter Berger’s theological conception 
of comedy. 
In Berger’s view, outlined in The Precarious Vision, it is possible to 
distinguish between tragedy and comedy in terms of their attitudes towards man’s 
subjugation to finitude. “Tragedy,” he writes, 
accepts the walls of the prison and perceives the human situation in terms of this 
acceptance. Comedy gives the impression that the walls are not as grim as they look. 
Tragedy is the perception of the human situation only under the aspect of immanence. 
Comedy is a signal, an intimation, of transcendence.48 
How we interpret this signal or intimation of transcendence depends, as Berger 
goes on to point out, upon the ultimate nature of reality, which is to say—since 
this is unknown—upon our view of the ultimate nature of reality. Referring in 
particular to the figure of the clown, he writes: 
If death is the last fact about man, then the art of the clown is a pathetic piece of 
emotional relief, a passing moment of benign illusion, doomed to the tragic finale of 
all things human. If, on the other hand, the universe is not a mindless machine 
destroying all within it, if death should turn out to be not the ultimate reality of the 
human phenomenon, then the clown’s magic takes on a strange new dignity. The 
comic transformation now may suddenly appear as a promise of a reality yet to 
come.49 
This “proleptic” dimension to comedy—which depends, to be sure, upon an act 
of faith, though its refusal requires an act of faith too—is especially significant 
for comedy that has to do with the ideal (Berger’s principal exemplar is Don 
                                                          
47 Bloch, The Principle of Hope, vol. 3, trans. Neville Plaice, Stephen Plaice, and Paul Knight 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1986), 1202. 
48 Berger, The Precarious Vision: A Sociologist Looks at Fictions and Christian Faith (New 
York: Doubleday, 1961), 212. 
49 Ibid., 213. 
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Quixote); however, his point holds in some sense for laughter as such, since its 
significance for Berger isn’t tied to “content.” Instead, on this reading, it is a sort 
of “ante-predicative” intimation that points towards and elliptically prefigures by 
eliciting an affective analogue of transcendence.50 The significance of this model 
of interpretation, even for literature that doesn’t endorse a religious vision, is 
indicated by Berger as follows: 
We quite miss the point if we only laugh at Don Quixote because he rides against 
windmills. The point is that, in the magic of the Quixotic universe, the windmills 
really cease to be windmills and are metamorphosed into a promise of glory. Of 
course, we know that “in this aeon,” as the New Testament puts it, the ride of Don 
Quixote ends in a sad return to what we take for granted as reality. But the Christian 
faith means looking toward the aeon that is to come. The magic moment of comedy 
foreshadows this aeon, when redemption becomes the one overpowering reality of the 
universe.51 
If this is the case, the debunking, de-creating or desecration of the ideal that is 
supposed to be accomplished by Byron’s laughter would not annihilate its 
proleptic significance—that is, its affective foreshadowing of “a reality yet to 
come.” On the contrary, the poet’s carnivalesque laughter would orient us towards 
an eschatological horizon even as it brought us “down to earth.” This kind of dual 
vision, which refuses as a false opposition the “either/or” of Keats’s “To a 
Nightingale” (“Was it a vision, or a waking dream?”) and is instead 
simultaneously faithful to the claims of visionary and quotidian experience, is 
overlooked by critics who espouse a “terminal” reading of the poet’s laughter; for 
Byron, however—whose music includes “some mystic diapasons”52—it remains 
a compelling possibility. The scriptural analogue in this case is not Samson 
pulling the temple down but the uplifting echoes of David’s harp, which 
chiastically lure the spirit above and are not dispelled by the mundane light of 
day: 
It wafted glory to our God; 
It made our gladdened valleys ring, 
                                                          
50 Elsewhere, Berger speaks of comic liberation as transcendence “in a lower key,” by which 
he means a momentary transcendence of “the reality of ordinary, everyday existence” that 
“does not in itself have any necessary religious implications.” This transitory experience 
does, nevertheless, involve “an intuition, a signal of true redemption, that is, of a world 
that has been made whole and in which the miseries of the human condition have been 
abolished.” This is what he means by transcendence “in a higher key”—that is, “religious 
in the full, proper sense of the word.” Thus, for Berger, the “lower” transcendence of 
comedy is distinct from but may open into a religious transcendence. Redeeming Laughter: 
The Comic Experience of Human Existence (New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1997), 205. 
51 The Precarious Vision, 218. 
52    Don Juan, XIV, 22.  
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The cedars bow, the mountains nod; 
Its sound aspired to Heaven and there abode! 
Since then, though heard on earth no more, 
Devotion and her daughter Love 
Still bid the bursting spirit soar 
To sounds that seem as from above, 
In dreams that day’s broad light can not remove.53 
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